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At Common Law no formal ceremony is essential to a valid
marriage, and an agreement between the parties per verba de prae-
senti to be husband and wife, there and then, constitutes a valid
marriage, no other ceremony being necessary. The validity of
such common-law marriage was recognized at an early date in our
American jurisprudence.1
EARLY HISTORY
Under the canon law, the contract of marriage was regarded
simply as consensual in nature, differing from other contracts only
in its being indissoluble even by the consent of the parties. No
ceremony or religious sacrament was required by this law, which
was regarded in England as the Common Law of marriages. While
the church elevated marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, it re-
spected its natural and civil origin, and did not absolutely require
the intervention of a priest. This canon law was changed by the
decree of the Council of Trent in 1563, which declared void any
marriage not solemnized by a priest in the presence of witnesses.
But it was not within the power of an ecclesiastical decree to af-
fect the status or civil relations of persons. This could only be
affected by the supreme civil power. The church might punish by
her censures those who disregarded her ordinances, but until the
decree of the Council was adopted and confirmed by the civil power,
the offspring of a clandestine marriage, which was ecclesiastically
void, would be held as canonically legitimate. The decree never
became effective in England, since that country, at the Reforma-
tion, disclaimed the doctrine of a sacrament in marriage, and re-
tained those rules of the canon law which had their foundation, not
in the sacrament nor in any religious view of the subject, but in the
natural and civil contract. The canon and civil laws as they were
administered in England were brought here by the early settlers of
this country, and were regarded by them as parts of the Common
Law, and those laws have been adopted and used in all cases to
which they were applicable whenever there have been conditions
existing to call for their use.
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THE ELEMENTS OF COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
Consent
In order to constitute a valid common-law marriage there must
be a contract or mutual agreement, that is to say a contract or
mutual agreement to enter into a matrimonial relation or to become
husband and wife; or, as frequently laid down, a contract or mutual
agreement to enter into a matrimonial relation or to become
husband and wife presently or as of the time of the contract or
* Student, University of Denver, College of Law.
135 A. J. 198, §128.
2 35 A. J. 201.
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agreement, with resultant obligations of husband and wife. The
contract or mutual agreement must be between persons capable in
law of making such a contract or agreement and must contemplate
a permanent union, exclusive of all others. A common-law marriage
differs from a ceremonial marriage with respect to the method of
expressing consent. The consent of the parties must be unequivo-
cally evidenced, but it may be evidenced in any form -or manner,
either verbally, including expression either orally or in writing,
or by conduct alone. No particular form of expression is necessary.
It need not be manifested in the presence of witnesses.
An example of the Colorado decisions on this element is to be
found in Klipfel v. Klipfel 3as follows:
A marriage simply by the agreement of the parties
followed by cohabitation of the parties as husband and
wife, and such other attendant circumstances as are
necessary to constitute what is termed a common-law mar-
riage may be valid and binding.
Also, actual words of agreement and consent are not always neces-
sary to create a common-law marriage,4 and the mutual consent
may be inferred from cohabitation and repute.5 Another case has
held that when admitting the habit and repute of marriage while ad-
mitting the absence of consent and contract, the law will hold the
relationship adulterous.6 The Radovich case 7 states that the agree-
ment must be in the present and not the future, as evidenced by
these words:
It is true that a mere contract for a future marriage
can never amount to a common-law marriage even though
followed by years of cohabitation and that a plan for a
future ceremony is sometimes incompatible with a pres-
ent marriage, but an agreement in praesenti to be now
and henceforth husband and wife may be valid even
though there is then an agreement for a future ceremony.
And an agreement, made after a valid marriage, to have
a ceremony, cannot vitiate the marriage.
Therefore, it is easily concluded that Colorado requires a con-
sensual agreement, as confined by these cases briefly set out.
Cohabitation
Cohabitation is another one of the essentials for a valid com-
mon-law marriage. Cohabitation is not a mere gratification of
sexual passion, or casual commerce between man and woman, and
no presumption can elevate concubinage of whatever duration to
the dignity of marriage. When the cohabitation is not clearly
matrimonial (when the circumstances are ambiguous or suspicious.
341 Colo. 40, 92 P. 26 (1907).
4 James v. James, 97 Colo. 413, 50 P. (2d) 63 (1935).
5 Smith v. People, 64 Colo. 290, 170 P. 959 (1918).
0 Peters v. Peters, 73 Colo. 271, 274, 215 P. 128 (1923).
1 Radovich v. Radovich, 84 Colo. 250, 269 P. 22 (1928).
DICTA
December, 1954
or the evidence meager), evidence of repute is quite essential to
give character to an ambiguous relation or to colorless circum-
stances.8 Where the relationship between a man and woman is
meretricious, it affords no basis for a common-law marriage.9
Yet some jurisdictions hold the fact that the relations of the parties
were at first illicit or meretricious does not prevent them from
afterwards contracting a valid common-law marriage. Whether
the parties intend to convert their meretricious relationship into
a common-law marriage is determinable from their conduct.10
Cohabitation is clearly an element in Colorado, and has been so
stated from as early as 1897 and subsequent cases.1 ' It is interest-
ing to note that cohabitation is presumed to be matrimonial-a
presumption of fact, not of law in Colorado.'
2
Consummation
It is generally conceded that the agreement must be con-
summated. A Colorado case states that admitting the existence
of the contract and its consummation, and the absence of habit
and repute (reputation in this use) the law will uphold the mar-
riage relation. 13 Thus, the writer is left with the impression that
consummation is an essential element in Colorado.
Repute
Although in some jurisdictions repute is deemed an element
of common-law marriage, it is not one of the essentials in Colo-
rado. In the Klipfel case it is stated that by general reputation and
repute is meant the understanding among the neighbors and ac-
quaintances with whom the parties associate in their daily life,
that they are living together as husband and wife and not in
meretricious intercourse.' 4 A later Colorado case has stated that
while habit and repute of marriage are not essential to the legality
of the relationship, evidence thereof is always competent and in
itself properly may be the basis for inferring consent to a contract
of marriage.15 It has also been stated that in cases where the con-
tract or agreement is denied and cannot be shown, its existence
may be proved by, and presumed from, evidence of cohabitation
as husband and wife and general repute. 16 Therefore, it can be
concluded that repute is a means of establishing the primary ele-
ment of consent, and possibly the other two elements.
SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS CONCERNING COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
As far as could be ascertained, 30 of the 48 states do not
835 A. J. 328, §221.
*Pickett v. Pickett, 114 Colo. 59, 161 P. (2d) 520 (1945).
20 Supra, note 8.
"Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. App. 303, 50 P. 1049 (1897); Klipfel v. Kllpfel,
41 Colo. 40, 92 P. 26 (1907); Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co. of Wis. v.
Industrial Comm., 124 Colo. 68, 234 P. (2d) 901 (1951); and others.
"Foley v. Gavin, 76 Colo. 286, 230 P. 618 (1924).
"Peters v. Peters, 73 Colo. 271, 215 P. 128 (1923).
24 Supra, note 11.
"Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 108 Colo. 388, 118 P. (2d) 769 (1941).
18Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Colo. App. 303, 50 P. 1049 (1897).
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allow common-law marriages to be formed in their jurisdiction. 17
It is obvious then that the trend has been away from common-law
marriages. We can ask ourselves why, and arguments for both
sides quickly appear.
Those advocating common-law marriage have three main
arguments:
1. Where no ceremony is employed and no record is made to
attest the marriage, the protection of the parties (mainly their
children) coupled with considerations of public policy require
some public recognition of such an arrangement as evidence of its
existence.
2. An older argument, which was re-affirmed by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in its proclamation of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,18 is that men and
women of full age have the right to marry and to found a family.
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage
and at its dissolution. Furthermore, marriage shall be entered into
only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses. It is
then contended that the only consent necessary should be the par-
ties and that if they so consent and assume the duties and obliga-
tions of marriage, that such a marriage should be sanctioned and
deemed valid.
3. The third argument is the familiar argument that if the
parties were together through sickness, health, etc., and actually
lived in the same manner as they would have if they had gone
through a ceremony, then why should the mere failing of a cere-
mony deprive the parties of the status of marriage.
A good argument against common-law marriage is presented
in 39 A.L.R. 547, which states as follows:
It has been said that there was a time, perhaps, when
the doctrine of a liberal construction of the testimony and
the slight proof of a common-law marriage subserved a
useful purpose, but that time is now passed, especially
since the legislature has undertaken to provide for the
formal solemnization of the marriage rites and to have
the fact of marriage preserved in records provided for
that purpose. This ancient doctrine is alien to the ideas
and customs of our people. It tends to weaken the public
estimate of the sanctity of the marriage relation. It puts
in doubt the certainty of the rights of inheritance. It
opens the door to false pretenses of marriage and the im-
position upon estates of supposititous heirs. It places hon-
est, God-ordained matrimony and mere meretricious co-
habitation too nearly on a level with each other.
Keezer 19 feels that where two persons intend to form a union
for life they can have no reasonable excuse for concealing the fact
Keezer, ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVoRcE, 3rd Ed. (1946).
'U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 16 (1) (2).
'9 Keezer, MARRIAGE AND Divoc, 3rd Edition, §§29, 30.
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from the rest of the world, for the celebration can be obtained with
little expense. Then there is always difficulty in determining
whether persons so loosely joined together are married or not, and
it requires very unpleasant and expensive litigation to determine
the question. He also feels common-law marriages furnish a means
of defeating the effectiveness of reform sought to be brought about
through legislation. Laws requiring pre-marital physical examin-
ations are rendered ineffective. It cheapens marriage and gives
instability to the home. Common-law marriage is seldom availed
of to protect children from the bane of illegitimacy. Other effective
means are being devised to protect such unfortunates. He con-
cludes by stating that the pioneer conditions which fostered com-
mon-law marriage in the United States have disappeared.
Briefly stated, these are some of the arguments concerning
common-law marriage. When one considers the prevailing system
of statutory formality and records reflecting the present increase of
interest on the part of the state and society in the institution of
marriage, it would seem an anachronism that some eighteen Amer-
ican states are willing to recognize the validity of a marriage
solely on the basis of the statement by a man and a woman that
they are husband and wife. Such a practice must be conducive of
instability in marriage and thus fosters the very evil which the
statutory requirements of license issuance, registration and public
administration were designed to prevent. Of necessity the stand-
ard of record for all marriages is thereby lowered. The difficulty
is increased by the fact that no two states are in entire accord as
to what constitutes a common-law marriage.
Nevertheless, there is a deep rooted sentiment in various parts
of the country in favor of the institution. This is due to the feel-
ing that innocent children ought not to suffer because their par-
ents have neglected the statutory formalities and that the refusal
of sanction to an informal union constitutes an invasion of the
most sacred right of the individual. It is true that by means of
a common-law marriage many marriages are upheld which other-
wise due to some impediment would be void. Frequently, however,
the judicial determination of the common law relationship comes
at so late a date-often after the death of one or both of the parties,
when the evidence is difficult to obtain-that there is little truth in
the popular idea that it furnishes "protection". The existence of
common-law marriage often opens the door to blackmail. After
the death of a man it is frequently possible for his mistress to
claim the rights of a common-law wife. On the other hand, if the
claims based upon illicit relations are presented during the lives
of the parties, a subsequent ceremonial marriage of one of them
may be made bigamous and the children bastardized. The recog-
nition of common-law marriages thus involves fundamental moral
and practical dilemmas. 20 And the question remains, should com-
mon-law marriage be abolished?
" Encyclopedia of the Social Science, Vol. IV, P. 57.
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